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Sound household financial conditions are relevant for both financial and monetary stability. 
Therefore, we analyse household financial fragility in a sample of euro area countries with 
the aim to shed some light on the nature of the large debt increase accumulated in recent 
years. We focus on household arrears on payment obligations, which are one of the most 
direct measures of financial stress of the sector. The probability of falling into arrears is 
derived from a life-cycle type of model and is investigated empirically using a cross-section 
and time series approach. We analyse cointegration and model arrears within an error-
correction framework. The results suggest that the financial conditions of households might 
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The sharp increase in the debt to income ratio in developed countries has raised concerns 
about a parallel rise in household financial fragility that would affect macroeconomic and 
financial stability. On the one hand, macroeconomic stability, financial developments and 
legal or institutional changes could have lead to an increase in the level of debt towards a new 
equilibrium by easing credit rationing. On the other hand, market imperfections may lead to 
mistakes in the bank credit policy in an expansionary phase. This, combined with the myopic 
behaviour of some lenders in a euphoric climate, may increase borrower’s debt levels 
excessively and result in an increase in problematic loans. Therefore, the aim of this paper is 
to understand to which extent the current increase in the debt to income ratio of households 
constitutes a movement towards a new equilibrium or, rather, is related to a riskier financial 
position for the sector. 
To highlight the issue we analyse an empirical model for the household’s ratio of non-
performing loans, which constitutes the best indicator available for household financial 
fragility. We derive the empirical specification from a life-cycle model which allows for the 
probability of default. The introduction of liquidity constraints into the life-cycle model 
allows to explain why changes in the structure of the lending market have a significant impact 
on the amount of household borrowing, and the fact that additional determinants can play a 
role in determining borrowing decisions (current income, nominal interest rate, disposable 
collateral, etc.).  Most models incorporate borrowing restrictions imposing them exogenously 
rather than explaining them as an endogenous response to default risk. Our theoretical set-up 
draws from Lawrance (1995), who introduces explicitly a default option into a model of life-
cycle consumption to explain how the possibility of default influences the level of 
consumption, its sensitivity to income, and the type of borrowing constraints likely to emerge. 
We use her basic set-up, but we extend the model to allow for the possibility to borrow, not 
only for consumption but also to invest in real or financial assets. 
The expression for the determinants of NPL obtained from the model is then studied 
empirically using a panel of seven euro area countries (Belgium, France, Finland, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain) and is estimated as an error-correction model. The dataset spans 
from 1989Q3 to 2004Q2, although the panel is unbalanced because for most countries such 
long series are not available.  
We find that the set of variables included in the model tends to explain a good proportion of 
the variation of arrears, indicating that the model captures quite well the factors behind 
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arrears’ developments. The model suggests that, in the long-run, an increase in the ratio of 
indebtedness to income is associated with higher levels of arrears. However, if the rise in the 
debt ratio is accompanied by a rise in real disposable income, the negative effect is more than 
offset. This suggests that increases in real disposable income would allow -other things being 
equal- relatively higher increases in the debt to income ratio combined with a same level of 
the ratio of arrears. Monetary conditions are also important because rising inflation and 
lending rates significantly worsen financial conditions. However, these effects might be 
difficult to perceive in the short-run given that the model needs around two years and a half 
for a complete transmission of possible shocks. 
Moreover, in the short-run the role of financial wealth and housing wealth (proxied by the 
house price index) tends to confirm the idea that wealth is used as a buffer in case of 
unexpected shocks. Even though, on the one hand, housing wealth, being less liquid, plays a 
minor role in relieving financial stress as compared to financial assets, on the other hand, it 
still helps, in accordance with the view that collateral can be used to overcome asymmetric 
information problems.  
In general, we can conclude that the recent rise in the debt ratio has put the household sector 
in a riskier financial position. In fact, the main attenuating impact on such risk is played by 
rises in income, but in the countries considered the evidence is that income has not grown 
enough to offset the effects of the increasing ratio of debt. At the same time, other possible 
short-term adjustments are absorbed only slowly. 
Finally, differences between countries seem to be very important and globally exacerbate 
household financial conditions. These differences are likely to be related to institutional 
characteristics and structural supply-side factors, which play a key role in determining the 
stability of financial conditions and, therefore, the equilibrium level of household debt. 
However, besides the relevance of country specific factors, we believe that considering the 
household sector from a euro area perspective can provide useful pieces of information for the 
conduct of the common monetary policy. 
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1. Introduction   
 
Over the past two decades in many countries household borrowing has grown considerably, 
both in absolute terms and relative to household income, reaching record levels. Such a sharp 
rise has received much attention because of its important macroeconomic and financial 
implications.  
The origin of such increase is related to the deregulation of financial markets that occurred in 
many countries during the first part of the 1980s (Group of Ten (2003), Girouard and Blondal 
(2001)). The deregulation process boosted competition among financial institutions obliging 
them to improve their efficiency. At the same time, the intense development in information 
technologies has implied a big change in the financial industry. Over the course of the last 
decade technological progress has reduced dramatically the high transaction costs that 
traditionally characterised financial intermediation in general and, mortgage finance in 
particular.  These costs were essentially related to the costs of information, the key input 
throughout the lending process; their reduction produced large economies of scale, further 
enhanced by industry consolidation (LaCour-Little, 2000). This evolution of the supply side 
of the market for credit has created the conditions for larger availability of credit to 
individuals (thanks also to the introduction and spreading of new financial products) and a 
reduction of borrowing constraints. These factors, together with the low interest rate regime, 
have contributed to the increase of household credit at historically high levels. 
Therefore, macroeconomic stability, financial developments and legal or institutional changes 
could have lead to an increase in the level of debt towards a new equilibrium by easing credit 
rationing without having increased risk. As a consequence, it is crucial to determine the extent 
to which the increase in the ratio of debt to income also implies an increase in the financial 
fragility of the household sector. Ideally one should explore this question by focusing at the 
level of individual households and use the individual information to draw a complete picture 
of the sector. Unfortunately, in the euro area the scarcity of information on a disaggregated 
basis did not allow us to conduct such disaggregated analysis. Thus, we focused on household 
financial fragility and, hence the quality of household loans portfolio, by using aggregate data. 
In particular, in the paper we investigate household sector financial fragility related to high 
debt burden in a sample of euro area countries.  
To measure financial fragility we concentrate on household debt reimbursement problems, 
interpreted as the most extreme outcome of excessive indebtedness. These problems are 
reflected in the ratio of debt arrears to total household debt.  More specifically, arrears on debt 
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are identified with non-performing loans. In the remainder of the paper, therefore, we will use 
arrears and non-performing loans (NPL) as synonyms. NPL are defined as loans that are in 
arrears for at least three months. Although the specific denomination for these loans varies 
across countries, the concept is very similar in all of them (for more details see appendix 3).  
Changes in the level of arrears are clearly linked with financial problems: an increase in the 
level of arrears is a sign of an increased proportion of financially constrained households. 
Therefore, being one of the most direct measures of household ability to repay the debt, 
arrears can be a good proxy for household financial fragility. Thus, we analyse empirically the 
behaviour of household non-performing loans to see how they react to possible changes in 
macroeconomic conditions to shed some light on the nature of the recent debt increase and its 
implications. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. First we discuss the relevance of household financial 
conditions for macroeconomic stability by explaining the links between debt, household 
distress and consumption in view of some stylised facts and on the basis of the theoretical 
literature. The third section derives a theoretical model for individuals’ decisions about 
consumption and debt when there is a possibility to default. This model allows to highlight 
the potential determinants behind household arrears to use in the empirical specification. 
Then, in the fourth section, we discuss some data issues and the empirical specification of the 
model. In section five we present the main results obtained from the cointegration analysis of 
non-performing loans and, finally, a few tentative conclusions are offered.  
 
 
2.  Macroeconomic relevance of household debt 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s there has been a rapid build-up of household debt in the euro 
area, both in terms of ratio of debt to disposable income and, in terms of debt to GDP. The 
ratio of total household debt to disposable income rose by more than 50% since the early ‘90s, 
reaching a ratio of 86% at the end of 2004. 
Notwithstanding that, the ratio of debt service burden to income, which is an important 
measure of the ability to face repayment commitments, has remained broadly unchanged 
during the last decade. The increase in principal repayments has been offset by the decrease in 
interest burden. Of course, although as a whole the ratio is the same, the increase in the level 
of debt involves higher sensitivity to changes in interest rates. Such higher sensitivity mainly 
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depends on the proportion of contracts with floating rates because in these contracts the risk 
related to changes in interest rates is fully transferred to the borrowers.  
Notwithstanding these general trends, the situation differs widely across the euro area 
countries. For instance, among the largest five euro area countries, the Netherlands has a ratio 
of household debt to GDP of 108% while in Italy the same ratio amounts to only 34%. At the 
same time the share of mortgage loans in the total also widely differs, ranging from the 50% 
of Italy to 88% in the Netherlands. These disparities give us an indication of the importance 
of country specific factors in explaining debt behaviour (e.g. different regulation in the 
mortgage market and in the housing market).  
Unfortunately, the ratio of arrears at the euro area level is not available, but we have this ratio 
for seven countries that represent about 70% of euro area population, being Belgium, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. As shown in Figure 1, during the sample period for 
which we have comparable data (since 1998) a general downward trend for the ratio of NPL 
can be observed, coinciding with an increase in the debt to income ratio. The only exception 
is Belgium, where the ratio of debt has remained broadly unchanged while the ratio of NPL 
has slightly increased. Looking at the developments for the six other countries, since 1998 we 
can observe significant increases in the ratio of debt although with different intensity across 
countries. France has registered the lowest increase, around 18%, while Ireland and Portugal 
the highest, with a rise of more than 100%. Spain, with a climb of 68%, stood above the 
average, while Italy and Finland experienced rises of 50% and 35% respectively. However, 
the ratio of non-performing loans has showed a pronounced decrease in the same period. The 
drop in the ratio of non-performing loans has been more similar across countries with respect 
to the debt ratio, ranging from 31% in France to 60% in Spain and Ireland. In the middle, 
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Therefore although increasing household debt ratios raise concerns about household financial 
fragility, so far this risk has not materialised. Thus, the aim of this paper is to understand to 
what extent the current situation can be explained by lags in the response of arrears to 
increasing debt ratios or rather by structural changes. In the first case we can expect as a 
consequence a dramatic increase in the ratio of arrears in the future, while in the second case 
we would not expect such negative effects. Gaining a better understanding on this issue is 
crucial also because both the stability of the financial system and monetary stability are 
closely related to household financial fragility. The stability of the financial system hinges to 
a large extent on household financial fragility because in most cases, despite the existence of 
collateral and lender’s legal protection, personal bankruptcy is costly for lenders. On 
theoretical grounds, in an efficient world bank lending rates should reflect the true default risk 
for the underlying assets and bank profitability; therefore the bank lending policy should be 
driven by the risk appetite of the banks. This, however, does no longer hold when the risk 
attitude of the bank changes over the cycle, or when a bank faces distorted incentives in 
taking lending decisions. For instance, disaster myopia, herding behaviour, perverse 
incentives and principal-agent problems may lead to mistakes in the bank credit policy in an 
expansionary phase. This, combined with the myopic behaviour of some lenders in a euphoric 
climate, may increase borrower’s debt levels excessively and result in an increase in 
problematic loans.  A rise in loan defaults higher than expected can then lead to a tightening 
in credit availability and, in turn, to a negative impact on consumption. Indeed, there is strong 
evidence of the cyclical behaviour of bank credit, loan losses and provisions. In a context of 
strong competitive pressure there is a tendency to loosen bank credit conditions in an upturn 
first, because contemporaneous non-performing loans are then at a low level and, second, 
because the market value of collateral increases. 
This may contribute to an overextension of credit. The low quality of these loans will only 
become apparent with the ex-post emergence of default problems, which will tend to appear 
with a lag of some years. Conversely, loan loss provisions (the counterpart of expected credit 
risk) have traditionally a pro-cyclical bias as they appear largely linked to the volume of 
contemporaneous problem assets. Once individual banks run into these problems, the link 
with wider economic instability is originated by market imperfections in terms of externalities 
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Household financial fragility also has a crucial role in the monetary transmission mechanism 
via the credit channel. Widespread imperfections in the credit market, such as asymmetric 
information or imperfect contract enforceability, result for consumers and firms in a wedge 
between the opportunity cost of internal funds and the cost of external funds. In turn, this 
external finance premium depends on the monetary policy. Tight monetary policy not only 
raises market rates of interest, but also raises the external finance premium, thus discouraging 
investment and consumption. The explanations for this link are twofold. The balance-sheet 
view, on the one hand, argues that the bridge between monetary policy and the external 
finance premium is represented by the financial position of borrowers. The bank-lending 
channel view, on the other hand, focuses on lender’s financial status (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995). The credit channel of monetary policy can be expected to be relatively effective in the 
housing market affecting consumption via residential property (Iacoviello and Minetti, 2003) 
as well as investment via commercial property (Davis and Zhu, 2004). Moreover, financial 
liberalization could have played a major role not only directly spurring house prices, but also 
indirectly, increasing the policy sensitivity of the housing market (Iacoviello, 2004). Even if 
the ratio of NPL doesn’t affect directly inflation, it affects the lending policy of the banks, 
such that it is an important determinant of the transmission mechanism and is likely to affect 
the final response to changes in the intervention interest rates. 
 
 
3.  A model for household arrears  
 
From a theoretical perspective,  with perfect financial markets and without uncertainty, 
household borrowing can be explained by focusing on demand-side determinants. According 
to the life-cycle model, therefore, aggregate household debt depends on demographic factors, 
the expected path of future income and real interest rates. In particular, the life-cycle and 
permanent income hypotheses consider consumer spending as a function of expected lifetime 
earnings, consisting of wage earnings and income from assets. To maximise utility, 
consumers aim to smooth consumption over time, despite varying incomes in different 
periods. The ability to do so hinges on consumers not facing credit constraints.  
In practice, however, consumers may not be able to borrow against expected future income. 
This happens because uncertainty is inherent to financial markets. Moreover, financial 
markets are not perfect and suffer from asymmetric information problems. As a result, moral 
hazard and adverse selection may lead to credit rationing. Therefore the ability to borrow for 
12
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individuals may be constrained by their current income and their ability to post collateral
1. 
Consumption would then vary with current income and net worth. Therefore, credit market 
developments can be important to explain household consumption. In particular, larger credit 
availability can lead to an increase in external financing resources and hence in current 
consumption. At the same time an excessive indebtedness can lead to higher debt-service 
burden with a possibly negative impact on future consumption.  
Adding liquidity constraints into the life-cycle model can, therefore, explain why changes in 
the structure of the lending market has a significant effect on the amount of household 
borrowing, and the fact that additional determinants  can play a role in determining borrowing 
decisions (current income, nominal interest rates, disposable collateral, etc.).   
Although some life-cycle models incorporated borrowing restrictions, these generally have 
been imposed exogenously rather than explained as an endogenous response to default risk. 
Our theoretical set-up draws from Lawrance (1995), who introduced explicitly a default 
option into a model of life-cycle consumption to explain how the possibility of default 
influences the level of consumption, its sensitivity to income, and the type of borrowing 
constraints likely to emerge. We use her basic set-up, a simple two-period life-cycle model 
with a default option, and we integrate it with a few extensions.  
In the model consumers maximise their lifetime expected utility and their consumption 
preferences are described by: 
[] 12 1 2
1





+      (1) 
where Ci is the consumption in period i , δ is the subjective rate of time preference and E(.) is 
the expectation operator, conditional on information available in period one. U is the constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function characterised by U’>0, U’’<0 and U’(0) equal 
to infinite. Consumption is linked to total income, Y, which is composed of labour income and 
income derived from own wealth. In the second period total income is uncertain, therefore, 
consumption is also uncertain. Total income is assumed to be a stochastic process: with 
probability  q period-two income is equal to YL, a low level of total income, while with 
                                                 
1 Credit constraints originate from the presence of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, 
which causes adverse selection and moral hazard problems.  For the lenders the best solution to these problems is 
credit rationing. Collateral plays an important role in credit rationing by reducing the cost of potential defaults, 
but also acting as a signal of the soundness and post-contractual behaviour of the borrower [Saurina and Jimenez 
(2004), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Bester (1985), Chan and Kanatas (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987a, b) and 
Chan and Thakor (1987), Aghion and Bolton (1992) and La Porta et al. (1998)]. 
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probability 1-q period-two income equals YH, a high level of income.   Consumers can borrow 
and lend freely at a risk-free rate R, which is exogenous. It is assumed that a borrower can 
increase period-one consumption by x1 units by giving up x2 units of period-two consumption, 
with x2 = (1+R)x1.  
In the presentation of the model we mostly focus on borrowing decisions. However the same 
model allows to analyse also savings decisions as well. In a way similar to borrowers, savers 
give up x1 units of period-one consumption in return for x2 units of additional period-two 
consumption. Since second-period consumption is not certain (because of the uncertain 
income), individuals maximise their intertemporal expected utility (2): 
      [] 12 1 1 2 2
1
(, ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 )( )
1
LH Vxx UY x q UY x q UY x
δ
=+ + + + − +
+ ,               (2) 
subject to the budget constraint:  x2 = (1+R)x1.  





(1 ) '( )
1
'( ) (1 ) '( ) LH
UY x
MRS R
qU Y x q U Y x
δ ++
== +
++ − + , (3) 
with borrowers characterised by x1>0,  x2<0 and savers by x1<0,  x2>0.  
In other words, in equation (2) x1 represents the amount lent (x1<0) or borrowed (x1>0) in 
period one. And x2 is the amount received as repayment (x2>0) or given as repayment (x2<0) 
in period two. In the context of this equation, with perfect capital markets, x2 will depend on 
the market real interest rate (R). 
 
However, banks are willing to lend at the riskless rate R only in perfect capital markets, 
therefore, with no risk of default. When the risk of default is introduced into the model, the 
borrowers’ intertemporal trade-offs and the terms of the loan change. Lawrance assumes that 
in case of default the bank can claim all income in excess of YL. This implies that, given that 
each borrower has q probability of receiving YL in period two, there is a q percent chance that 
the bank will receive no repayment. Obviously, in this case banks are no longer willing to 
lend at the risk-free rate, R. Instead they will charge a competitive borrowing rate at which the 
expected profits equals zero, so that 1+r = (1+R)(1+rp), where rp is the risk premium charged 
by banks and depends on the collateral provided, the probability of default and market 
conditions in general. If the bank prices the risk in a correct way, it must hold that 1+rp 
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equals 1/(1-q), although this is not necessarily the case. Moreover, banks are willing to lend at 










In other words, introducing the default option implies that the borrowing rate exceeds the 
risk-free rate. 
If the default occurs in the low income state, a borrower who accepts x1 in period one has to 
give up x2 units of period-two consumption only with probability 1-q. We also assume, 
without loss of generality, that a share of the loan might be used for real or financial 
investment
2.  I is the value of the investment in each period and is globally considered as 
state-dependent
3. Therefore, the exogenous probability of default depends on the outcome of 
income and of net wealth together. In case of default the bank can claim the income in excess 
of YL and the financial and real assets. The model by Lawrance assumes that when in period 
one people borrow only for consumption purposes. We extend the model to include the 
possibility for people to borrow also to invest in financial or real assets. Implicitly we are 
admitting that different investment opportunities can offer different real yields. Therefore, the 
interest charged on the loan shall be different from the expected return of the real or financial 
investment. In the long run, we expect the rate of return to be associated with the risk of the 
asset, but in the short term it could also be related to misalignments in the pricing of these 
assets (e.g. bubbles).  
 
Hence, in case of default, borrowers maximise expected utility (4) subject to the budget 
constraint (5)
4: 
  [] 12 1 1 1 2
1
(, ) ( ) () ( 1 )[ ( )
1
LH Vxx UY I x q UY q UY I x
δ
=− + + + − + +
+     (4) 
  21 (1 ) x rx =− + . (5) 
                                                 
2 This means that in gross terms an individual can borrow at an interest rate that depends on the operation’s risk 
and, at the same time, lend a part (invest) at another interest rate. A net borrower will be the one who borrows 
more than he lends. 
3 If I is invested in bonds then the return is more or less certain at the bond yield rate I(1+r). If I takes the form of 
housing investment then the return may be the real house price. If it is in equity then the return may be the share 
price. 
4 In this second case the expected utility of a non-borrower has a different formulation and is not show here. The 
full development of the original model can be found in the paper by Lawrance (1995). 
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With regard to equation (4) we should be aware that it is a two-period model, and we assume 
that the whole wealth available in period two has to be consumed then. I1 represents the 
investment on financial or real assets made in period one, and it appears with a minus sign 
because is part of the income that is not consumed in period one so is not providing any utility 
in this period. I2 is the market value in real terms of this investment in period two, which will 
depend on the real yield of this investment. Given that we assume that in the last period the 
whole wealth is consumed the market value of this investment in real terms in period two (I2) 
will enter the utility function
5.  
The real yield will be different depending on the investment risk (bonds, shares, real assets...). 
The income as dividends, interest, or rent would enter as income in period two (Y2) and the 
revaluation of the market value will be included in the term I2. Both, the income and the 
market value are state dependent. Again, we assume two states: good times where there is no 
default ((Y+I)H > -x2 ) and bad times where there is default ((Y+I)L < -x2 ). In good times, in 
period two the borrower will have for consumption the high income and the high market 
value for the investment less the amount to be repaid. In the low state, he will have only the 
low income, which is the amount that we assumed the lender cannot claim given bankruptcy 
rules. In the context 
.of this equation, with imperfect capital markets, x2 is the amount to repay 
for the loan x1 at the real lending interest rate r charged in this operation. The latter, as already 
explained, depends on the risk free rate (R) and the risk premium associated with the risk 
profile of the borrower, the guarantees provided, etc.  
The first order condition of the optimisation process is shown in equation (6), which defines 




(1 ) '( )
1





qU Y I x
δ +− +
== +
−+ + . (6) 




(1 ) '[( ) ] '( )(1 )
(1 ) '[( ) ]
H
H
rU Y I x U Y I x
q
rU Y I x
δ ++ + − − + +
=
++ + , (7) 
recalling that (1+r) = (1+R)(1+rp) and that x2<0 and x1>0. 
 
It follows that the probability of default, which we associate with the chance of falling into 
arrears, depends on the amount of the loan taken, x1, on current income, Y1 and investment, I1.  
                                                 
5 We could assume that a part of the wealth in the last period is kept as a legacy. However this would complicate 




Working Paper Series No. 570
January 2006 
Arrears depend also on the bank lending rate, r, the (uncertain) future income and wealth, 
which globally depend on the possibility of unemployment and on the development of asset 
prices. Finally arrears depend on the time preference, δ, which we associate with individuals’ 
expectations about inflation.  
 
 
4.   Empirical analysis 
 
4.1  The data  
 
Our database consists of quarterly time series for the households sector at country level. The 
main series we are interested in is the amount of non-performing loans of the household 
sector. This type of information is not available for every country and, moreover in most 
countries non-performing loans have been split by sector only recently. Therefore the 
database only covers seven out of the twelve countries of the euro area being Belgium, 
France, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. These countries all together represent 
about 70 percent of the euro area’s population. 
As already mentioned, in order to analyse household financial fragility the crucial piece of 
information is the amount of non-performing loans of the household sector. Non-performing 
loans are loans in arrears. These are given different names in different countries: arrears, bad 
loans, doubtful loans, bad debt. Despite the different labels, they generally represent the same 
thing: credit in repayment delay for at least three months.  What differs across countries is 
how long non-performing loans are defined as such, i.e. how long it takes before the loan can 
be judged as non-recoverable and, hence, can be written off as a loss for the credit institution. 
The timing of this process depends on national regulation. In France and Italy the time before 
a loan can be written off is particularly long, thus the same loan can be accounted as non-
performing for several years while in other countries the same loan will be considered as non-
performing for no more than six months. Therefore, the fact that in France and Italy the stock 
of non-performing loans as a proportion of the total loans’ stock is larger seems to a large 
extent to be related to the long degree of persistency of the same loan among non-performing 
loans rather than fundamental causes (Moody’s, 2003).   
The figures on stocks of both non-performing loans of households and total households loans 
come from country sources. These data are publicly available and are taken from the 
statistical publications of national central banks. Appendix 3 describes the key variables used 
in modelling arrears and gives the details about the data sources.  
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4.2     The empirical model  
 
Following the theoretical discussion from section 4, we base our empirical analysis on the 
following expression, which is a more explicit version of equation (7): 
     
npli,t = f( debti,t , income i,t , assets i,t, real leni,t , unempl i,t, infl i, t , hp i,t, own i,t )    (7’) 
where npli,t denotes the log of the ratio of household non-performing loans to total household 
loans for country i at time t and proxies the financial fragility of the sector. Npl will be a 
function of debti,t, the log of the ratio of total household debt (including mortgages, consumer 
loans and credit cards)
6 to household disposable income; of the log of real disposable income 
per household, incomei,t; of the log of the ratio of household gross financial assets to 
disposable income, assetsi,t; of the real lending interest rate real leni,t; of the unemployment 
rate unempli,t the to account for uncertainty related to future income; and finally the inflation 
rate infli,t. These are the core variables of the model, i.e. the determinants of the probability of 
falling into arrears as derived from the empirical model (cf. last paragraph of section 3). 
Therefore we believe that these are the variables that should matter in the long-run. However 
we also added a few other variables that appeared to be relevant in the empirical literature 
investigating household borrowing. These are the house price index, hpi,t to account for the 
variability in housing wealth and the ratio of owner-occupied dwellings, owni,t, as a proxy of 
the share of collateralized loans. In line with the discussion of section 2, we think that this 
latter variable is important in order to account for the distinct effect that collateralized loans 
might have on the probability of falling into arrears, as opposed to loans without collateral. 
Given the asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, collateral can be a signal 
of high quality borrowers, therefore we can expect a negative relationship between collateral 
and loan default. The variable owni,t is defined as the ratio of owner occupied dwellings as 
percentage of total dwelling stock. This ratio includes outright owners and mortgagors.  
The ratio of mortgagors over total loans or total dwellings would have been a more accurate 
measure of collateralized loans but, unfortunately is not available for many countries during 
the sample period. Therefore, we use own as a proxy of the ratio of collateralized loans under 
the implicit assumption that the proportion of households with mortgages is higher within the 
group of owner occupiers than within the group of investors who buy a house to rent or  
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speculate. Nonetheless, this variable could capture also other effects that arise from the 
different tenure structure in the housing market, as for instance the fact that when buying a 
house owner occupiers are hedging the risk of housing price movements
7 or the different 
financial profile of people who buy a house to live and those who buy to invest
8. 
  
As mentioned in the previous section, we analyse a dataset including seven euro area 
countries (N=7) over a period spanning from 1989Q3 to 2004Q2. This panel is unbalanced 
because for most countries such long series are not available. Therefore, we perform the 
analysis also on a shorter, but balanced panel spanning from 1998Q2 to 2004Q2 which 
excludes Finland
9 (thus with N=6). The advantage of using the unbalanced panel is that it has 
more observations and that the results are less dependent on a specific period. However, we 
do not expect the results for the two panels to be qualitatively different, such that the analysis 
of the balanced panel represents a kind of robustness check for the larger dataset.  
The use of pooled time series and cross sections allows us to take into account the unobserved 
and time invariant heterogeneity across countries.  
In terms of the econometric model, we interpret (7’) as a dynamic model of household arrears, 
specified as an error correction model. In Fact, we believe that the behaviour of non-
performing loans is dynamic in nature in the sense that the past level of non-performing loans 
can explain the current level. This derives from the fact that the stock of arrears at time t is the 
accumulated amount of arrears originated in previous periods that was not yet withdrawn 
from the book-accounts. Moreover the current ratio of non-performing loans will influence 
the banks lending policy, affecting the future financial conditions and therefore the behaviour 
of  the non-performing loans ratio in the future. The use of this specification is also in line 
with the existing literature (e.g. Davis, 1995; Whitley et al., 2004). The error correction 
specification has also the advantage of capturing both short-run and long-run effects on NPL.  
Special care is needed in the treatment of the data. In particular, dynamic panel data analysis 
is characterised by two sources of persistence over time: first, autocorrelation due to the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors; and second, autocorrelation 
due to the individual effects characterising the heterogeneity among the individuals. While it 
                                                 
7 Investment for speculative purposes is in principle riskier. This might imply a higher cost of the loan 
independently of the availability of collateral. In fact, solvency regulation asks for different capital requirements 
when mortgages are given to buy a house to live or for other purposes. 
8 We can expect that on average people who buy a house as an investment are wealthier than owner occupiers. 
As such, they might have a greater buffer to absorb adverse shocks, not only in housing prices but in general. 
This goes in the opposite direction in terms of risk.  
9 For Finland figures for NPLs of households are available only starting from 1999Q3. 
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is well known that in typical micro-panels (with large N and small T) the fixed effect (FE) 
estimator is biased and inconsistent when the model is dynamic, in macro-panels the FE 
estimator might be less so because T is typically larger (Baltagi and Kao, 2003)
10. However, 
given the nature of our data it is essential to detect possible non-stationarity of the series.  In 
such a case, even in macro-panels (with N small and T large) the fixed effect estimator is 
likely to be biased and inconsistent
11. If the data were characterised by the presence of unit 
roots, we would have to check for the presence of possible cointegrating relationships and 
subsequently express the dynamic model as an error correction model (ECM) constraining the 
long-run according to the cointegration analysis. According to Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(1999), even if the dynamic specification is unlikely to be the same in all countries, it is still 
possible to pool the estimates treating the model as a system because the efficiency gain from 
pooling the data outweighs the losses from the bias introduced by heterogeneity (Baltagi and 
Griffin, 1997). In such a case, it has been shown in Kao and Chen (1995) that the OLS in 
panel cointegrated models is asymptotically normal, but biased. Therefore, alternative 
estimators have been suggested for the estimation of the long-run, like the fully modified OLS 
(FMOLS). 








i t i j it j i it j i it j i i t
j




∆= ∆ + − + + ∑  (8) 
 
where t = 1, …, T and i = 1,…, N, nplit is the ratio of NPL, zi,t-j is a vector of explanatory 
variables as described in (7’),  βi represent the long-run parameters and αi are the equilibrium 
adjustment parameter (ecm). Finally, µi are the fixed effects; however we will treat these 
parameters as common across countries according to the mean group restriction. 
However, for expression (8) to be meaningful, the existence of a long-run equilibrium must be 
assessed. Thus, in the next section we will first analyse the nature of individual series and test 
for panel cointegration using the test developed by Pedroni (1999 and 2004).  
 
 
                                                 
10 In order for the consistency of the estimator to hold the disturbances of the model must be i.i.d., but this does 
not hold when the number of periods is finite.  
11 Binder et al. (2000) show that also the GMM estimator based on the standard orthogonality condition breaks 
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5.  Panel cointegration analysis 
 
A graphical inspection of the series suggests possible non-stationarity and indeed, both the 
time-series and the panel unit roots tests do not allow rejecting the hypothesis of non-
stationarity. Table A1 in Appendix 1 shows the results for some unit root panel tests, which 
seem to have more power in the case of pooled cross-section and times series. In general we 
find that for all the series used have unit roots. The tests results allow also excluding the 
presence of variables integrated of order two. 
Having assessed that the series are integrated of order one, the next issue is the existence of a 
long-run equilibrium; to do that we use the Pedroni cointegration, as already mentioned in the 
previous section. The Pedroni test is based on a panel unit root test of the residuals estimated 
from the general regression: 
it i i i it it yt z e θλ β =+ + + 
where  θi  are the scalars denoting fixed effects and  λi  are the unit specific linear trend 
parameters. The test has an asymptotically normal distribution (as the cross section dimension 
increases) and allows for heterogeneity among the panel members. The test is based on seven 
statistics, four of which are called panel statistics and pool the autoregressive coefficient in 
the residual based test, while the remaining three statistics, the group statistics, take the 
average, hence allowing for more heterogeneity. The panel tests are the panel v-statistic, the 
panel ρ-statistic and a non-parametric and parametric panel t-statistics. The group tests are the 
group ρ-statistic and the two group t-statistics. If these statistics allow detecting a stable long-
run relationship linking the regressors, their coefficients and their respective significance 
might be estimated with the FMOLS
12.  
Table 1 shows the results of the test for the existence of a cointegrating relationship linking 
household npl, debt, income, infl, real len and unempl. We performed the test both on the 
unbalanced panel and on the shorter, balanced panel. As the table shows, in the former case 
we can reject the null of no cointegration only in three cases, while in the case of the balanced 
panel we reject in five out of the seven tests statistics of the Pedroni test. This evidence 
globally does not appear sufficient to discard the existence of a stable long-run relationship 
for arrears
13. 
                                                 
12 Fully Modified OLS. 
13 We are aware that in small panels - like in this case - the power of the test can decrease in a non negligible 
way. Despite this fact, Pedroni (2004) shows that when N<T and T is relatively small, the group t and the panel t 
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Table 1: Pedroni cointegration tests
14 
  Unbalanced panel (N=7)  Balanced panel (N=6) 
  Stat. value  p-value  Stat. value  p-value 
Panel v  -0.23 0.59  2.11  0.03 
Panel ρ  -0.40 0.69  -0.39  0.70 
Panel pp t  -3.08 0.00  -6.28  0.00 
Panel t  -0.97 0.28  -2.04  0.04 
Group ρ  1.30 0.90  0.95  0.83 
Group pp t  -3.92 0.00  -6.12  0.00 
Group t  -2.06 0.04  -3.18  0.00 
 
Therefore, we may estimate the significance of the long-run dynamics using the FMOLS 
estimator developed by Pedroni. This allows two distinct types of estimations. The first is 
based on the ‘within dimension’ of the panel and provides estimations at individual level. The 
second is the panel group FMOLS estimator which pools the data along the ‘between 
dimension’. The FMOLS allows addressing some type of heterogeneity typical in dynamic 
cointegrated panels. In particular there can be two sources of heterogeneity: one is in the form 
of the fixed effect form, reflecting differences in mean level among the variables of different 
countries and can be modelled by means of specific intercepts (time dummies). Hence we use 
common time dummies to capture temporal cross-sectional dependency
15. The second source 
of heterogeneity stems from differences in which countries respond to short-run deviations 
from equilibrium that develop in response to stochastic disturbances.   
The panel group FMOLS estimator allows for greater flexibility in presence of heterogeneity 
of the cointegrating vectors because it does not require a common cointegrating vector under 
the alternative hypothesis. Moreover its point estimates can be interpreted as the mean value 
for the cointegrating vectors and suffer from much lower small-size distortion than the within 
                                                                                                                                                          
are the most powerful statistics, thus given that they reject we believe that concluding in favour of cointegration 
is the best choice. 
14 We are grateful to P. Pedroni for making his RATS procedures available to us. 
15 In presence of cross-section cointegration the power of the Pedroni cointegration test can be altered. Although 
we were unable to test explicitly cross-unit cointegration, we carried out a unit-by-unit cointegration analysis and 
found the same rank across units, which should limit the distortion effect. Moreover, according to Banerjee et al. 
(2004) the size of the distortion when N is small is relatively limited. 
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estimator. Table 2 illustrates the resulting long-run relationship linking NPL to the 
macroeconomic variables for the group of considered euro area countries. For the reasons just 
explained in the table we report only the panel group estimation. The individual country 
results, however, are illustrated in Appendix 2. As mentioned in section 4.2 the variables that 
explain arrears in the long run are the core variables, derived directly from the theoretical 
model. The only variable derived from the structural model that does not appear here is the 




Table 2: Panel Group FMOLS cointegration estimation 
 
                                                  Dependent variable: npl 
  Unbalanced panel  
N=7;    obs=221 
Balanced panel 
 N=6;    obs.150 
 Coeff.  p-value  Coeff.  p-value 
debt   0.93 0.00  0.40  0.00 
income  -1.48 0.13  -0.16  0.50 
infl  0.23 0.00  0.05  0.00 
real len  0.28  0.00 0.03  0.00 
unempl  0.07 0.00  0.04  0.11 
 
    
The second column of Table 2 shows the panel group estimated parameters for the 
unbalanced panel. We can notice that the household ratio of debt to income displays a high  
and positive impact on the probability of falling into arrears in the long-run, while the effect 
of household disposable income appears also to be large, but negative (although not 
significant), thus largely compensating the debt effect. Income is the only wealth component 
that appears in the long-run equation indicating that for most of the indebted households the 
other components (financial and real wealth) are not really important. This might suggest that 
these households are probably not the main holders of financial assets or do not have 
dwellings for investment but only to occupy.  
The inflation rate has a positive semi-elasticity equal to 0.23% and is significant. On 
theoretical grounds the expected sign of this variable is ambiguous. One can expect a positive 
                                                 
16 This variable is not in the long run because its inclusion did not allow accepting cointegration and moreover 
was not significant.   
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effect on arrears if the contracts are characterized by floating interest rates, but also a negative 
effect in real terms given the nominal nature of the debt, although these arguments should 
play a more important role in the short run given that both rely on market rigidities and 
unexpected shocks. However, over the last years low levels of inflation have been associated 
with less volatile inflation, so that surprises are less likely to occur, thus decreasing the 
likelihood of falling into arrears. This argument would be more consistent in the long run 
given that is linked with the perceived uncertainty. In the long run we expect contracts to 
adjust to inflation, so the effect of the cost of borrowing is captured by the real interest rate. 
Inflation in the long run is capturing the effect of a less volatile price regime and therefore 
less uncertainty. The positive estimated coefficient, therefore, suggests that lower volatility 
has contributed to the better performance of the ratio of arrears.  
The real lending rate, as expected, has also a positive and significant impact on arrears, 
meaning that an increase in the level of real interest rates also implies an increase on the level 
of NPL.  
As expected, the unemployment rate displays a positive effect on arrears to indicate the 
uncertainty of future income. It should be also noted that with the exception of disposable 
income all the variables are strongly significant
17.  
 
The panel group coefficients for the balanced panel are displayed in the forth column of Table 
2. In general the size of the coefficients is much smaller in this case. This might be related to 
the smaller power of the estimation because of fewer observations available. Again income is 
not significant, but in this case unemployment is also insignificant. Also in this case the 
significance of the coefficient for income is not affected by the presence of unemployment, so 
that the same considerations about households’ behaviour hold. It should be also noticed that 
in this case the income coefficient is much smaller with respect to one from the unbalanced 
panel. This suggests that when limiting the time period to the most recent past the increase in 
income was not sufficient to compensate the increase in the debt ratio.  
                                                 
17 Notice that if households discount their expectations rationally at time t, income and unemployment should 
capture the same thing. However, the presence of unemployment in the long-run relationship appeared to be 
necessary for the cointegration to hold and to be meaningful. Moreover the non-significance of income was not 
affected by the presence of unemployment. This suggests that household might not fully take into account their 
expectations with respect to the future. 
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The final step consists of estimating the error correction model with the short- and long-run 
on arrears. Table 3 shows the estimation results based on the SUR method
18, where the 
variables explaining the short-run adjustment are expressed in differences with respect to the 
previous year (∆). The choice of taking the seasonal difference is motivated by two factors. 
First, in the data section we mentioned that the ratio of non-performing loans, our main object 
of interest, is a highly persistent measure because of the way NPL are defined, such that the 
variability of this ratio with respect to the previous quarter might be very small. Second, we 
believe that households do not update their decisions and expectations very often; in this 
sense the difference with respect to the previous year might better mirror household 
behaviour. However, we are aware that the use of the series in difference with respect to 
previous year might introduce autocorrelation. To solve this problem the error-correction 
model is estimated with a SUR method that corrects both for period heteroskedasticity and 
correlation of observations within the same cross-section. Similarly, the long term is 
expressed with the variables at t-4.  
The results for the dynamic specification accord with our expectations and are well 
determined. The long-run here is represented by the ecm  term which is the cointegrating 
vector previously estimated and described in Table 2.  The adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium is 0.09, so that after one year less than 40% of the adjustment has taken place and 
it takes around two years and a half to go back to the long-run equilibrium.  
For the short-run we adopted a general-to-specific approach, thus we tried several 
specifications including the core variables that are also present in the long-run, plus the 
additional variables.  
We first analyse the unbalanced panel. As already mentioned, this includes one additional 
country with respect to the balanced one (Finland) and has many more observations, therefore 
is the one that we consider as more reliable. With regard to the short-term determinants of 
arrears, the short-run elasticity for household disposable income is negative and larger than 
one, similarly to the long-run. Credit rationing justifies this variable in the short-run. The fact 
that it might not be possible to borrow against the future income explains why consumption 
depends on changes in income, or more accurately, on changes in the liquidity position. At the 
same time this variable also affects the long-run via human wealth expectations. As long as a 
                                                 
18 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. 
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change in income is viewed as permanent, it means a change in wealth, hence with an impact 
in the long-run.  
Table 3: Dynamic model estimation 
                    Dependent variable: ∆npl t 
  Unbalanced panel (N=7)  Balanced panel (N=6) 
  Coeff. St.  err. Coeff. St.  err. 
∆income t  -1.654*** 0.650  -1.006*  0.536 
∆assets t  -0.238*** 0.089  -0.088 0.067 
∆nom len t  0.021* 0.013  0.014  0.015 
∆hp t    -0.004  0.003  -0.008***  0.002 
∆own t  -0.087*** 0.030  -0.516**  0.023 
Ecm t-4  -0.092*** 0.029 -0.486***  0.086 
constant  1.288***  0.411    1.143***  0.206 
BE  -0.016  -0.239   
ES  -0.106  -0.530   
FI  -0.276      
FR  0.060    0.307   
IE  0.010  -0.151   
IT  0.169      0.661   
PT  0.077  -0.047   
 
R² = 0.62   
no. obs =193  
R² = 0.76 
no. obs =108 
Note: ***, **, * denote respectively significance at 1, 5 and 10%. 
 
Financial wealth also displays a negative impact and reflects the possibility to use liquid 
assets as a buffer: the availability of financial assets decreases the probability of falling into 
arrears by 24 percent. The fact that this variable is significant only in the short-run suggests 
that it is typically used for short-term adjustments.   
The nominal lending rate appears with a positive sign and captures both the effect of inflation 
and of the real lending rates together. As already noted, in the short run because of market 
rigidities depending on the market structure, inflation might also play a role in the real cost of 
the loan, in the same direction as the real interest rate. With floating interest rate contracts
19 
then inflation is transmitted to the cost of the loan more rapidly than to the salaries, and then it 
has a real impact in the financial position of the household. Given that the effect goes in the 
same direction and the observable variable is nominal interest rates we opted for using this 
variable in the short run as a proxy for the cost of the loan.  
                                                 
19 In the euro area almost half of lending contracts are based on floating interest rates. 
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The ratio of owner-occupied houses also results highly significant and negative and accounts 
for the proportion of collateralized loans which are usually less risky, while house prices 
appear to have a very small effect, moreover, are not significant.  
Finally, in the model we also used the spread to account for supply conditions. In particular, 
the spread should represent the risk premium charged by banks. However this variable was 
never significant, so was not included in the final specification. Note also that the coefficient 
for the constant is quite high and positive indicating that there are relevant country-factors 
that cannot be captured by the selected variables, but that tend to increase financial fragility. 
In fact the table also shows the individual fixed effects for which, however, the significance is 
not available
20. It can be seen that in Finland and to a lesser extent in Belgium and Spain the 
impact on arrears is smaller than the average picture for the whole sample. This indicates that 
the household living in one of these countries are less likely to fall into arrears, while on the 
contrary those leaving in Italy are the most likely to run into financial problems. However, as 
we highlighted in section 4.1, most differences between countries seem to be related to the 
structural supply-side factors, the very different legal and fiscal environment
21 and, last but 
not least, to the different definition of NPL, which directly affects the ratio of arrears. 
The last two columns of Table 3 display the results for the balanced panel. Comparing these 
columns with the ones referring to the unbalanced panel we remark that for disposable 
income, financial assets and the nominal interest rate the impact on arrears is markedly 
smaller, moreover the latter two are not significant. Conversely, the coefficient for own and 
the error correction term are much larger.  
As opposed to the unbalanced panel including Finland, here house prices are also relevant, 
although their effect is still quite weak. An increase in house prices might be viewed by 
households as an increase in wealth, so that the higher market value of housing stock due to 
rising house prices has an attenuating impact on arrears. Higher house prices in connection 
with an increase in the ratio of owner-occupied properties might also account for the easing in 
credit conditions enhanced by the increasing value of collateral. 
                                                 
20 The fixed effects estimates sum to zero and should be interpreted as deviations from an overall mean. They do 
not have reported standard errors because the program treats them as nuisance parameters for the purpose of 
estimation.  
21 Examples of determinants at country level are the typical loan length, the quality of risk management, the 
loan-to-value ratios, the technological advances, and institutional changes. All these variables are very difficult 
to measure overtime; that is why we could not measure their impact directly.  
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Note that we also tried the equivalent specifications with simple differences (not shown here). 
No major differences could be noticed for the unbalanced panel in terms of size and 
significance of the coefficients.  For the balanced panel, however, only income, the error 
correction term and the constant were significant. In any case, as already mentioned we 
believe that the model expressed in yearly differences described above better represents 
household behaviour and thus is more informative. 
A general conclusion we can draw from the empirical results presented above is that the 
recent increase in the share of debt taken by households had a negative impact on their 
capability to reimburse it.  Therefore, the household sector in general is characterised by a 
riskier position in financial terms. Even though in the short-term several factors might help 




The sharp increase in the debt to income ratio in developed countries has raised concerns 
about a parallel rise in household financial fragility that would affect macroeconomic and 
financial stability. One of the aims of this paper is to understand to which extent the current 
increase in the debt to income ratio constitutes a movement towards a new equilibrium or, 
rather, is related to a riskier financial position for the sector. To highlight the issue we 
analysed an empirical model for the ratio of non-performing loans, which constitutes the best 
indicator available for financial fragility. We derived the empirical specification from a life-
cycle model which allows for the probability of default. Then we used a panel of seven (or 
six) euro area countries and estimated an error-correction model. We found that the set of 
variables included in the model tends to explain a good proportion of the variation of arrears, 
indicating that the model captures quite well the factors behind arrears’ developments. The 
model suggests that, in the long-run, an increase in the ratio of indebtedness to income is 
associated with higher levels of arrears. However, if the rise in the debt ratio is accompanied 
by a rise in disposable income, the negative effect is more than offset. This suggests that 
increases in real disposable income would allow -other things equal- relatively higher 
increases in the debt to income ratio combined with a same level of the ratio of arrears. 
Monetary conditions are also important because rising inflation and lending rates significantly 
worsen financial conditions. However, these effects might be difficult to perceive in the short-
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run given that the model needs around two years and a half for a complete transmission of 
possible shocks. 
Moreover, in the short-run the role of financial wealth and housing wealth (proxied by the 
house price index) tends to confirm the idea that wealth is used as a buffer in case of 
unexpected shocks. Even though, on the one hand, housing wealth, being less liquid, plays a 
minor role in relieving financial stress as compared to financial assets, on the other hand, it 
still helps, in accordance with the view that collateral can be used to overcome asymmetric 
information problems.  
In general, however, we can conclude that the recent rise in the debt ratio has put the 
household sector a riskier financial position. In fact, the main attenuating impact on such risk 
is played by rises in income, but in the countries considered the evidence is that income has 
grown less than the ratio of debt. At the same time other possible short-term adjustments are 
absorbed only slowly. 
Finally, differences between countries seem to be very important and globally exacerbate 
household financial conditions. These differences are likely to be related to institutional 
characteristics and structural supply-side factors, which play a key role in determining the 
stability of financial conditions and, therefore, the equilibrium level of household debt. 
However, besides the relevance of country specific factors, we believe that considering the 
household sector from a euro area perspective can provide useful pieces of information for the 
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Appendix 1: Unit root analysis 
 
 
Table A1 displays the results of some panel data unit root tests on the variables used in the 
empirical model. The first two tests, the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) and the Hadri test, assume 
that there is a common unit root process,  so that the persistence parameter (the autoregressive 
coefficient usually denominated as ρi) is common across cross-sections (hence,  ρi = ρ for all 
i). While the LLC test is based on the null hypothesis of unit root, the Hadri test is based on 
the null of no unit root
22. Conversely, the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test allows for 
individual unit root processes and, therefore, ρi may vary across cross-sections and combines 
the individual unit root tests to derive a panel specific result. The IPS employs as null 
hypothesis the presence of a unit root, with the alternative that some of the individual 
processes are stationary. 
 
Table A1: Panel unit root tests 
Levin, Lin, Chu  Hadri  Im, Pesaran, Shin 
 
t*-stat  p-value  Z-stat  p-value W-stat  p-value 
npl  -2.71 0.00 10.01 0.00 0.42 0.66 
∆npl  -3.77 0.00 2.17 0.02 -5.68 0.00 
debt  -0.84 0.20 9.05 0.00 1.76 0.96 
∆debt  -6.20 0.00 4.93 0.00 -6.28 0.00 
income  -3.18 0.00 11.41 0.00 0.19 0.57 
∆income   -1.99 0.02 3.25 0.00 -5.60 0.00 
assets  1.29 0.10 5.65  0.00  1.53  0.06 
∆assets  -8.40 0.00 0.92 0.18 -11.59 0.00 
infl  -0.59 0.28 1.73 0.04 -2.42 0.01 
∆infl  -2.31 0.01 0.90 0.18 -4.87 0.00 
nom len  -1.65 0.05 -2.43 0.01  5.90  0.00 
∆nom len  -4.34 0.00 -0.30 0.62 -6.20 0.00 
real len  -0.10 0.46 7.34 0.00 0.35 0.64 
∆real len  -8.10 0.00 0.53 0.30 -9.90 0.00 
unempl  -0.98 0.16 -0.67 0.00  7.26  0.25 
∆unempl  -3.10 0.00  -  -  -  - 
hp  2.41  0.99  4.98  0.00  8.47  1.00 
∆hp  -5.52 0.00 3.07 0.00 -8.68 0.00 
own  2.52 0.99 8.60 0.00 -1.92 0.03 
∆own  -9.31 0.00  -  -  -  - 
 
                                                 
22 This test is very similar to the KPSS unit root test in the case of time series. 
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Table A1 shows the tests on the series in levels and the general evidence one can extract is 
that all the series appear to have unit roots. Only for the nominal lending rate the tests provide 
unclear results. As additional evidence, we also performed the Breitung panel unit root test 
(not shown here) which clearly accepted the null of unit root (t-stat = 0.24, p-value: 0.60) 
such that the evidence does not appear sufficient to exclude the unit root. 
We also performed the same tests on the series in first differences and the results allow 
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Appendix 2: Country cointegration relationships 
 
Table A2: Individual FMOLS results 
   Dependent variable: npl 
  Unbalanced panel (N=7) Balanced panel (N=6) 
Country             Variable    Coefficient    t-statistic  Coefficient    t-statistic 
debt                   -2.81         ( -12.14 )  -1.72         ( -18.61) 
income              3.94          (  7.29 )  0.02          (  0.09 ) 
infl  -0.14         ( -2.13 )  0.06          (  3.51 ) 
unempl  -0.14         ( -5.41 )  -0.07         ( -7.27 ) 
 
Belgium 
real len     0.02          (  0.55 )  0.03          (  1.76 ) 
debt                   -1.70         ( -3.38 )  -0.05         ( -0.10 ) 
income              -2.84         ( -4.03 )  -1.40         ( -1.52 ) 
infl  -0.01         ( -0.08 )  -0.09         ( -1.56 ) 
unempl  -0.06         ( -4.19 )  0.02          (  1.31 ) 
Spain 
real len     0.07          (  0.96 )  -0.08         ( -1.32 ) 
debt                   6.64          (  6.77 )     
income              -24.29        ( -17.44 )      
infl  1.72          ( 12.83 )      
unempl  -0.07         ( -3.68 )     
Finland 
real len     1.81          ( 13.68 )     
debt                   -1.08         ( -2.89 )  0.07          (  0.26 ) 
income              0.33          (  0.53 )  -1.75         ( -1.67 ) 
infl  -0.11         ( -2.64 )  -0.02         ( -0.93 ) 
unempl  0.02          (  0.31 )           0.00   (  0.04 ) 
France 
real len     -0.02         ( -0.55)  -0.01  ( -0.28 ) 
debt                   0.35          (  1.02 )  -0.30         ( -0.55 ) 
income              1.76          (  1.42 )  -0.58         ( -0.33 ) 
infl  0.14          (  5.45 )  0.09          (  2.71 ) 
unempl   0.24          (  5.92 )  0.04          (  0.59 ) 
Ireland 
real len     0.06          (  2.02 )  0.11          (  3.04 ) 
debt                   5.35          (  5.38 )  5.39          (  4.19 ) 
income              8.71          (  9.58 )  1.31          (  0.98 ) 
infl  0.13          (  1.47 )  0.29          (  7.86 ) 
unempl  0.43  ( 15.57 )  0.17          (  4.70 ) 
Italy 
real len     0.06          (  0.98 )      0.11        (  7.41 ) 
debt                   -0.26  ( -3.00 )  -1.03         ( -6.55 ) 
income              2.06  (  5.95 )  1.47          (  2.41 ) 
infl  -0.15  ( -4.43 )  -0.05         ( -1.53 ) 
unempl  0.05  (  5.22 )  0.06          (  4.07 ) 
Portugal 
real len     -0.04         ( -2.67 )  -0.01         ( -0.51 ) 
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NPL: Arrears on consumer credit and mortgages to individuals, from NBB, Centrale des 
crédit aux particuliers. 
Unemployment: Unemployment rate from OECD database (series code 
MEI.Q.BEL.UNRTRG01.STSA). 
Real lending rate: Nom. lending rate – Inflation  
Nom. lending rate: Lending rate, IFS database. 
Inflation: (CPI index (t) - CPI index (t-4))/CPI index (t-4), CPI index from IFS database. 
Debt: Financial liabilities of individuals, Ch. 16 Statistical Bulletin NBB. 
Income: Household disposable income, from National Accounts (Belgostat) interpolated 
using the quarterly variation of Gross National Income (Eurostat). 
Real wealth: Total household wealth - net financial wealth. Total household wealth comes 
from Rademaekers K. and  J. Vuchelen (1999), KBC (2003) and own estimates, 
interpolated using the quarterly variation of house prices (ECB). 
Financial wealth: Financial assets from Annual Financial Accounts interpolated using the 
quarterly variation of stock prices (BEL20 index) + Debt. 
HH: Number of households, Eurostat (quarterly frequency obtained by linear interpolation of 
annual data).  
Own: Ratio of owner occupied houses, from “Housing Statistics in the European Union 2003” 
National Agency for enterprises and housing. 
HP: House price index, from ECB. 
Spread: Nominal lending rate – Treasury bill rate, IFS database. 
 
Spain 
NPL:  Total doubtful assets.  Banco de España. 
Unemployment: Unemployment rate from IFS database. 
Real lending rate: Nom. lending rate – Inflation  
Nom. lending rate: Lending rate, IFS database. 
Inflation: (CPI index (t) - CPI index (t-4))/CPI index (t-4), CPI index from IFS database. 
Debt: Total household debt outstanding, Banco de España. 
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Income: Household disposable income from National Annual Accounts, interpolated using 
growth rate of GNI (Eurostat). 
Real wealth: Housing wealth of households and NPISH
23, Banco de España (series code 
BESI_01.05.ES.33). 
Financial wealth: Gross financial wealth = Financial assets, Banco de España (series code 
BESI_01.05.ES.). 
HH: Number of households, Eurostat (quarterly frequency obtained by linear interpolation of 
annual data). 
Own: Ratio of owner occupied houses, from “Housing Statistics in the European Union 2003” 
National Agency for enterprises and housing. 
HP: House price index, ECB. 
Spread: Nominal lending rate – Treasury bill rate, IFS database. 
 
Finland 
NPL: Non-performing assets related to households
24, Finlands Bank. 
Unemployment: Unemployment rate from IFS database. 
Real lending rate: Nom. lending rate – Inflation. 
Nom. lending rate: Lending rate, IFS database. 
Inflation: (CPI index (t) - CPI index (t-4))/CPI index (t-4), CPI index from IFS database. 
Debt: Stock of total banks’ lending to households, Finlands Bank. 
Income: Disposable personal income, OECD database (series code OEO.Q.FIN.YDH). 
Real wealth: derived from the number of existing dwellings (from European Mortgage 
Federation) and the house market price (the initial house price is derived from “Housing 
Statistics in the European Union 2003” and was grown on a quarterly basis using 
residential property prices from the National Statistical Institute).  
Financial wealth: Gross financial wealth = Financial assets from Finlands Bank.  
HH: Number of households, Eurostat (quarterly frequency obtained by linear interpolation of 
annual data). 
Own: Ratio of owner occupied houses, from “Housing Statistics in the European Union 2003” 
National Agency for enterprises and housing. 
HP: House price index, ECB. 
Spread: Nominal lending rate – Treasury bill rate, IFS database. 
                                                 
23 Non-profit institutions serving households. 
24 Household sector includes individual enterprises with is less than 2 employees and NPISH.  
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France 
NPL: Gross doubtful debt of households, Banque de France (series code 
MH.Q.ME.CREDIT.3.R.1D.DL.X.T.X.B.X). 
Unemployment: Unemployment rate from OECD database. 
Real lending rate: Nom. lending rate – Inflation.  
Nom. lending rate: Lending rate, IFS database. 
Inflation: (CPI index (t) - CPI index (t-4))/CPI index (t-4), CPI index from IFS database. 
Debt: Total household debt outstanding, Banque de France (series code 
MH.Q.ME.CREDIT.3.R.1D.TO.T.T.X.B.X). 
Income: Disposable personal income, OECD database (series code OEO.Q.FRA.YDH). 
Real wealth: Non-financial assets of household from OECD interpolated using the quarterly 
variation of residential property prices (ECB). 
Financial wealth: Financial assets from OECD interpolated using the quarterly variation of 
stock prices (France CAC 40 index) + Debt.  
HH: Number of households, Eurostat (quarterly frequency obtained by linear interpolation of 
annual data). 
Own: Ratio of owner occupied houses, from “Housing Statistics in the European Union 2003” 
National Agency for enterprises and housing. 
HP: House price index, ECB. 
Spread: Nominal lending rate – Treasury bill rate, IFS database. 
 
Ireland 
NPL: Non-performing loans on residential mortgages, Central Bank of Ireland and own 
estimations. 
Unemployment: Unemployment rate from OECD database. 
Real lending rate: Nom. lending rate – Inflation.  
Nom. lending rate: Lending rate, IFS database. 
Inflation: (CPI index (t) - CPI index (t-4))/CPI index (t-4), CPI index from IFS database. 
Debt: Residential mortgages outstanding, Central Bank of Ireland. 
Income: Disposable personal income, OECD database (series code OEO.Q.IRE.YDH). 
Real wealth: Derived from the number of existing dwelling (from European Mortgage 
federation) and the house market price (the initial house price is derived from the Annual 
Report 2002 of the Central Bank of Ireland, Annex C and was grown on a quarterly basis 
using the residential property price index (ECB). 
38
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 570
January 2006 
Financial wealth: Estimated from total financial assets in Ireland assuming that the share held 
by households equals the relative share of Belgian households + Debt.  
HH: Number of households, Eurostat (quarterly frequency obtained by linear interpolation of 
annual data). 
Own: Ratio of owner occupied houses, from “Housing Statistics in the European Union 2003” 
National Agency for enterprises and housing. 
HP: House price index, ECB. 
Spread: Nominal lending rate – Treasury bill rate, IFS database. 
 
Italy 
NPL: Bad debts of households, Banca d’Italia, Supplements to the Statistical Bulletin, 
Monetary and Financial indicators, table TDUE0120. 
Unemployment: Unemployment rate from IFS database. 
Real lending rate: Nom. lending rate – Inflation.  
Nom. lending rate: Lending rate, IFS database. 
Inflation: (CPI index (t) - CPI index (t-4))/CPI index (t-4), CPI index from IFS database. 
Debt: Total household debt outstanding, Banca d’Italia, Supplements to the Statistical 
Bulletin, Monetary and Financial indicators, table TDME0070. 
Income: Disposable personal income, OECD (series code OEO.Q.ITA.YDH). 
Real wealth: Non-financial assets of household from OECD interpolated using the quarterly 
variation of residential property prices (ECB). 
 Financial wealth: Net financial wealth, from the Annual Financial Accounts of the Euro Area 
(ECB) interpolated using the quarterly variation of stock prices (MIB 30 index) + Debt. 
HH: Number of households, Eurostat (quarterly frequency obtained by linear interpolation of 
annual data). 
Own: Ratio of owner occupied houses, from “Housing Statistics in the European Union 2003” 
National Agency for enterprises and housing. 
HP: House price index, ECB. 
Spread: Nominal lending rate – Treasury bill rate, IFS database. 
 
Portugal 
NPL: Non-performing loans to private individuals, Banco de Portugal. 
Unemployment: Unemployment rate from IFS database. 
Real lending rate: Nom. lending rate – Inflation.  
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Nom. lending rate: Lending rate, IFS database. 
Inflation: (CPI index (t) - CPI index (t-4))/CPI index (t-4), CPI index from IFS database. 
Debt: Total outstanding debt to private individuals, Banco de Portugal. 
Income: Household disposable income from National Annual Accounts interpolated using the 
quarterly variation of Gross National Income (Eurostat). 
Real wealth: Derived from the number of existing dwellings (from European Mortgage 
Federation) and the house market price per square meter (the initial house price is derived 
from Banco de Portugal, and was grown on a quarterly basis using the residential properties 
price index  (Banco de Portugal).  
Financial wealth: Net financial wealth,  of the household sector  from Banco de Portugal 
interpolated using the quarterly variation of stock prices (PSI20 index) + Debt.  
HH: Number of households, Eurostat (quarterly frequency obtained by linear interpolation of 
annual data). 
Own: Ratio of owner occupied houses, from “Housing Statistics in the European Union 2003” 
National Agency for enterprises and housing. 
HP: House price index, ECB. 
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